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DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REALLY HAVE TOO
MUCH POWER? UNDERSTANDING THE
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES’ PRINCIPLES OF
HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY*
NESTOR M. DAVIDSON** & RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER***
This Article explains and defends the National League of Cities’ Principles of
Home Rule for the 21st Century, which the authors participated in drafting.
The Principles project both articulates a vision of state-local relations
appropriate to an urban age and, as with previous efforts stretching back to the
Progressive Era, includes a model constitutional home rule article designed to
serve as the foundation for state-level constitutional law reform. This Article
explains the origins of the Principles, outlines the major components of its model
constitutional provision, and defends the model against a set of criticisms
common to this and past home-rule reform efforts. Necessitated by the
increasingly hostile relationship between cities and their states, the Principles
would reset the state-local relationship to better align local legal authority with
the actual role that local governments play in contemporary governance.
Currently, cities do not have sufficient authority to address the basic problems of
urban governance, and the global pandemic has illustrated the widening gap
between cities and their states over even the most basic public health and safety
issues. Cities are seeking to address these and other constituent concerns but are
regularly stymied by state law that is often aggressively deployed to punish local
officials and limit their democratic responsiveness. A reformed home rule is an
essential aspect of the states’ “internal federalism” and is crucial to addressing
the challenges of twenty-first century governance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, the National League of Cities (“NLC”) published the Principles
of Home Rule for the 21st Century (“Principles”),1 a groundbreaking new vision of
local-government legal authority to match the increasingly central role that
cities play in our contemporary system of governance. The Principles project,
however, is not meant to be an abstract rumination on home rule. As with
previous efforts by predecessors to the NLC and similar models stretching back
to the Progressive Era, the Principles includes a model constitutional home rule
article designed to serve as the foundation for genuine state-level law reform.2
Those past efforts were met with resistance, as undoubtedly will this
present one. State officials do not readily choose to give up power, especially if
they contemplate it being potentially wielded by political opponents. Devolving
authority to cities, which the Principles seeks to do, has long been unpopular
with central governments because it means those governments and their elected
officials exercise less power.
In each era of reform, a set of standard criticisms of city power has
emerged; these criticisms tend to combine hostility to cities with a skepticism
of the exercise of local democratic authority based on an assumption that local
governments are poorly managed, corrupt, or otherwise inferior to some
(usually idealized) state government.3 In recent years, state politicians have
stated these criticisms in somewhat crude, political terms—suggesting, for
example, that the exercise of city power is a threat to American values.4
1. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2020),
as reprinted in 100 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2022) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
2. See id. at 1330–43, 1350–53 (describing the background of the Principles and including the
model constitutional home rule article).
3. See infra Part III.
4. Consider Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s statement: “As you leave Austin and start heading
north, you start feeling different . . . . Once you cross the Travis County line, it starts
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This Article is a response to a slightly more academic—though still
somewhat overwrought—critique recently authored by Professor David
Schleicher.5 Schleicher hits all the high notes of the committed anti-localist. He
argues that NLC’s model would lead to a colorful parade of horribles,
exacerbating exclusionary zoning, reifying local political process failure,
unleashing fiscal irresponsibility, and solidifying the fragmentation of regional
governance.6 Contrary to the careful recalibration of state and local authority
embodied in the model constitutional article at the heart of the Principles,7
Schleicher sees constraints on state oversight in zero-sum terms, empowering
local governments with no corresponding responsibility imposed on the exercise
of that power, as though existing state oversight has been meaningfully
exercised in any real way.8
We think those criticisms are badly overstated and misunderstand both
the current distribution of power between states and local governments and
what the Principles would require going forward. In this Article we take an
opportunity to respond to some of those criticisms after describing the Principles
and the project’s theoretical and practical foundations. We should say at the
outset that we assisted in drafting the Principles, working alongside six other
experienced scholars of state and local government law.9 We urge you to read
them. We are quite confident that these proposals are in the mainstream of

smelling different. And you know what that fragrance is? Freedom. It’s the smell of freedom that
does not exist in Austin, Texas.” Jonathan Tilove, Gov. Abbott: Austin Stinks and So Does ‘Sanctuary
Sally,’ STATESMAN, https://www.statesman.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/shorter-gov-abb
ott-austin-stinks-and-does-sanctuary-sally/goq6JEihda4PzADg2lOMgO/ [https://perma.cc/BK2J-LM
9R] (June 6, 2017, 11:25 AM). Donald Trump has made similar claims on his now-suspended Twitter
account. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 14, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%5C%22burning+and+crime-infested%5C%22 [https://perma.
cc/W6PF-DNH6] (referring to “burning and crime infested inner-cities”). These views reflect an
abiding historical anti-urbanism. Cf. Paul Krugman, The Durable Myth of Urban Hellholes, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/12/opinion/covid-big-cities.html [https://
perma.cc/A9C9-ULL4 (dark archive)] (“The rise of a knowledge economy has led to a growing
concentration of jobs and wealth in large, highly educated metropolitan areas, leaving much of smalltown and rural America stranded. And this loss of opportunity has ended up being reflected in social
disintegration, just as the disappearance of jobs did in many inner cities half a century ago.”). See
generally STEVEN CONN, AMERICANS AGAINST THE CITY: ANTI-URBANISM IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2014) (discussing anti-urbanism in America).
5. See generally David Schleicher, Constitutional Law for NIMBYs: A Review of “Principles of Home
Rule for the 21st Century” by the National League of Cities, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2020) (reviewing and
critiquing the Principles).
6. See id. at 898–921.
7. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1348–50 (“[T]he model provisions below primarily set forth
a structure to balance state and local authority . . . .”); see also id. at 1353–84 (providing commentary to
the Principles’ model state home rule constitutional article).
8. See Schleicher, supra note 5, at 898–921.
9. Professors Richard Briffault, Paul Diller, Sarah Fox, Laurie Reynolds, Erin Adele Scharff,
and Rick Su.
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reform efforts, even if they elicit opposition from those who are and will likely
remain skeptics of the exercise of city authority.
In this moment—when cities are the dominant economic, political, and
social actors in their regions, states, and nations10—that skepticism is antiquated
and outdated. Indeed, any fair-minded evaluation of the nature of local legal
authority today would have to conclude that the balance between state and local
power simply does not reflect the role that local governments play in
contemporary governance. The Principles’ model constitutional home rule
article provides a basis for resetting the state-local relationship to create a new
equilibrium in places where local responsibility is not matched by local
authority.
Part of that rebalancing—an important part—responds to the rise of
sweeping, targeted, and increasingly punitive preemption. The preemption
explosion has been extensively documented;11 it is reminiscent of the era of
“ripper” bills, when states stripped local governments of their offices and
responsibilities, ensuring that they would be governed by the state legislature.12
But as dysfunctions in governance revealed by the current pandemic sadly
underscore, there is a second, equally important imperative for reform: while
local governments form a critical frontline of governance on many issues that
were once primarily considered state or federal, they lack legal authority to
match that responsibility in too many places.13 Any sweeping rejection of
localism does a disservice to a serious effort to respond to significant and
growing pathologies in the current structure of state and local government law.
Contemporary state overreach and local powerlessness have serious
negative consequences. States are capriciously blocking policy experimentation
10. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CITY, STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MEGACITY
(2020) (discussing the prevalence of cities in the twenty-first century).
11. See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2020) (examining structural preemption); Richard Briffault, The
Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, New Preemption]
(examining the rise of new, aggressive preemption); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering
of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018) [hereinafter Scharff, Hyper Preemption]
(describing the various forms of hyper preemption); Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local
Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133 (2017) (observing that preemption has reached “epidemic
proportions”); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018)
[hereinafter Schragger, Attack on American Cities] (illustrating the explosion of preemption). See
generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & LAURIE REYNOLDS, THE NEW
PREEMPTION READER: LEGISLATION, CASES, AND COMMENTARY ON THE LEADING CHALLENGE
IN TODAY’S STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (2019) [hereinafter BRIFFAULT ET AL., THE
NEW PREEMPTION READER] (collecting materials on the new preemption).
12. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of
Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 805–
06 (1992) [hereinafter Briffault, Voting Rights] (recounting the nineteenth-century history of “ripper
bills” through which states gave themselves power over specific elements of local governance).
13. See infra Part I.
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and undermining the ability of local governments to solve a range of problems,
notably including the COVID-19 public health emergency.14 Doing so in turn
weakens local capacity, sapping the practical potential of local democracy. The
right model—again, as the recent pandemic has made eminently clear—is
partnership, not just between local governments and states, but across local,
state, and federal governments. Without a clear legal basis for local authority,
however, that cooperative model is much harder to achieve, especially in a
polarized political environment in which states can import the most arbitrary
decision-making to what should be a cautious exercise of displacing local
democracy.
The Principles seeks to reinforce that legal authority and to reinvigorate
home rule doctrines that have long existed nominally but have in practice gone
underenforced or ignored. The Principles, however, has an additional purpose.
One would assume from reading Professor Schleicher’s critique that local
governments are to blame for most of the intractable problems of twenty-first
century governance, including inequality, abusive policing, affordable housing,
corruption, and democratic failure.15 But, of course, what we well know is that
state and national policy-making is as (or more) dysfunctional and increasingly
so. Any simplistic and sweeping critique of local democracy as inherently
flawed—dominated by homevoters, subject to capture, perennially parochial, as
the standard tropes play out—has to answer the fundamental “as-opposed-towhat” question. This is a question that modern anti-localists so rarely even try
to answer.
Moreover, the policy failures that excite opposition to local control are not
actually “local”; indeed, they are rightfully placed at the states’ doorsteps.16 One
might assume from the extreme political attacks on American cities17 that local
governments are currently fully empowered, doing terrible damage with
absolutely no oversight. But, in actuality, a regime of nearly unfettered state
power is what currently exists in most states. All states permit fairly aggressive
preemption of local laws, and all states allow for extensive regulation in almost
all pertinent policy areas.18 The states have had every opportunity to address

14. See Kim Haddow, Derek Carr, Benjamin D. Winig & Sabrina Adler, Preemption, Public Health,
and Equity in the Time of COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 71, 72–73
(2020) (reviewing a range of state policies preemptive of local public health measures during the early
part of the pandemic); David Gartner, Pandemic Preemption: Limits on Local Control over Public Health,
13 NE. U. L. REV. 733, 747–63 (2021) (surveying examples from Nebraska, Iowa, Georgia, and
Florida).
15. See Schleicher, supra note 5.
16. See infra Part II (discussing housing affordability, pension crises, and other policy flashpoints).
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III (discussing ideological resistance
to home rule).
18. See infra Part I.
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the problems of twenty-first century governance in the United States but have
mostly failed to do so.
Why? Because state power has never effectively addressed—or
meaningfully attempted to address—the core concerns of urban policy in the
United States, including urban decline, racial segregation, entrenched poverty,
and the adequate and fair provision of education, health care, housing, and
public safety.19 States have long had very limited capacity, let alone will, to
address the frontline needs of local governments and their residents. And real
local democracy—the actual exercise of municipal power—has never really been
tried in the United States.
Part I of this Article describes the background and impetus for the drafting
of the Principles and then describes the NLC’s new model. It observes how the
Principles is in fact a relatively mild response to an otherwise significant crisis
in state-local relations in many U.S. states. Part II considers a number of policy
areas that critics of home rule argue are failures of local administration. We
dispute that contention, arguing that state policy is mainly responsible for
undermining effective responses to the continuing challenges of twenty-first
century urban governance. Part III considers the ideological blinders that lead
reformers to resist a workable devolution when there is abundant evidence that
state domination is not working. The challenges of modern urban governance
continue to go unaddressed not because cities exercise too much power but
because they do not exercise enough.
I. THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM OF LOCAL AUTHORITY AND THE NLC’S
STRUCTURAL RESPONSE
Local-government authority and home rule have been focal points of
contestation and reform since the Founding Era, and the NLC’s Principles is
only the most recent of a long line of efforts to balance the state and local legal
relationship to reflect the structure of contemporary governance.20 To
understand why a new model of state-local legal relations is necessary today, we
start by describing the structural concerns that provided the impetus for reform
underlying the Principles project. We then turn to the responses to these

19. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 964 (1967)
(“Our cities are not merely non-cities, they are anti-cities—mean, ugly, gross, banal, inconvenient,
hazardous, formless, incoherent, unfit for human living, deserts from which a family flees to the greener
hinterlands as soon as job and income permit, yet deserts growing so rapidly outward that the open
green space to which the family escapes soon shrinks to an oasis and then it too turns to a desert.”); see
also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 4 (1961) (describing
midcentury urban renewal as “not the rebuilding of cities,” but “the sacking of cities”).
20. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257 (2003) (arguing that
home rule has been wrongly equated with local legal autonomy and that late-nineteenth-century urban
reformers from the first home-rule movement did not seek local legal autonomy).
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concerns that are embodied in the NLC’s model constitutional home rule
article, outlining the reform proposal and explaining its primary provisions.
A.

Weaknesses of the Current Legal Regime

The Principles begins with the proposition that the structure of state-andlocal-government law is significantly misaligned with the critical governance
role that cities, counties, and even smaller local governments play today.21 The
contemporary global economy has increasingly come to center on metropolitan
areas and the local governments that most immediately manage them. As the
Principles notes,22 in 2010, urban metropolitan areas in the United States housed
nearly eighty-one percent of our nation’s populace, a trend that is growing more
pronounced every decade, as highlighted by the 2020 Census.23 And as the U.S.
Conference of Mayors has documented, on the eve of the current public health
crisis, cities produced over ninety-one percent of our GDP.24 Our most
productive metro areas dwarf the economic output of most states—in 2018, New
York City’s $1.85 trillion gross metropolitan product exceeded that of the entire
State of Texas (not to mention entire countries like Russia and Canada), while
the Los Angeles metro area topped the State of Florida’s gross state product.25
Indeed, U.S. metro areas represent a dozen of the world’s fifty highestproducing economies.26
The centrality of local governance to our contemporary demographics and
economy is matched by the growing role that cities and other local governments
are playing in policy innovation. The reality is that across an array of pressing
concerns—public health, of course, but also labor and employment,
environment protection and the climate crisis, emerging technology, and many
others—local governments have become a significant locus for pragmatic,
evidence-based policy-making at a time when the states, let alone the federal
government, too often seem to have abandoned that project.27
However, local governments are being called to play these vital roles
against the headwinds of increasing state interference—in particular the rising
21. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1336–41.
22. See id. at 15.
23. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Statistics Highlight Local Population
Changes and Nation’s Racial and Ethnic Diversity (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2021/population-changes-nations-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/GQ53-R
5UM] (reporting that metropolitan areas grew by nine percent between 2010 and 2020 and now house
eighty-six percent of the population).
24. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, U.S. METRO ECONOMIES: ANNUAL REPORT AND FORECAST 1
(2019), https://www.usmayors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/mer-2019-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/
74EQ-WJZZ].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 11, at 1999–2001; Schragger, Attack on American
Cities, supra note 11, at 1169.
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abuse of state-law preemption. In large swaths of the country, the warping of
this traditional tool of governance is a driving force in state politics.28
Preemption, as a growing body of literature underscores,29 has become sweeping
in scope, covering almost every area of local policy. At the same time, state
legislatures are also enacting statutes targeting specific exercises of local
authority.
As preemption has become increasingly partisan, most troubling is a new
punitive turn that has significantly raised the stakes in state-local conflicts:
states now threaten to eliminate local funding if local governments challenge
preemption, and states have likewise found novel ways to expose local
governments to civil liability in preemption conflicts.30 Moreover, concluding
that merely preempting local authority is not sufficient to resolve differences,
states have begun targeting local officials who disagree with the boundaries of
state limitations, opening up individual officeholders to loss of pay—witness
Florida’s docking the pay of school board officials for issuing masking policies
in local schools amidst a resurgence of the pandemic for a recent example—
removal, civil penalties, and even criminal liability.31
Given both affirmative and defensive arguments for bolstering local legal
authority, in what ways is contemporary home rule structurally inadequate?
Some states, of course, still do not have home rule despite nearly a century and
a half of reform stretching back to Missouri’s constitutional amendment of
1875.32 But even states that have well-recognized home rule often have
ambiguities and gaps in the initiative function of home rule.33 Courts at times
have grappled with whether seemingly straightforward state constitutional
delegations of the power to act could be as broad as their framers intended,
creating unnecessary uncertainty for local officials.34

28. See generally Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local
Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403 (2017) (tracking patterns within the trend of increasing state
preemption of local policies).
29. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 11, at 1999–2008 (surveying the breadth and
depth of the new preemption); Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 11, at 1169–83 (same);
Scharff, Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1494–507 (same).
30. See BRIFFAULT ET AL., THE NEW PREEMPTION READER, supra note 11, at 11–16 (describing
novel aspects of new preemption compared to the traditional exercise of state oversight of local
governance).
31. Id. at 13–14.
32. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1126–27 (2007) [hereinafter Diller,
Intrastate Preemption] (surveying the landscape of states without home rule); see also Barron, supra note
20, at 2289–90 (discussing Missouri and the origins of home-rule reform).
33. RICHARD BRIFFAULT, LAURIE REYNOLDS, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON, ERIN ADELE
SCHARFF & RICK SU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 390–
482 (9th ed. 2022) [hereinafter BRIFFAULT ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW].
34. See, e.g., Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 892, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2007),
vacated as moot, No. 06 C 7014, 2008 WL 8915042 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008) (reviewing a challenge to a
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At the same time, local fiscal authority has been significantly undermined
by state limitations while local governments have had increasing needs for fiscal
capacity. Home rule has been interpreted in some states to be particularly
limited in the context of local revenue, and the rise of state constitutional taxand-expenditure limitations, such as California’s Prop 1335 and Colorado’s
Taxpayer Bill of Rights,36 has left many local governments in a particularly
challenging bind as states continue to call on them to provide so many critical
services.37
And the emergence of the punitive turn in preemption highlights ways in
which the mechanisms of local democracy are fodder for state interference, even
on matters much more prosaic than the potential personal liability of local
officials. Local governance choices around everything from elections to the
allowable forms and structures of local governing bodies to procedures over
legislation, budgeting, and administration—not to mention a variety of other
issues, such as freedom of information, open meetings, conflict of interest, and
ethics—are regularly made at the state level.
One might reasonably question the majoritarianism of local democratic
processes; local politics are not free of the pathologies that afflict state and
national political processes. But many of these cases are easy. The state is not
stepping in to protect city residents or prevent damaging spillover effects when
the state prevents a majority-minority city from removing Confederate statues
in city-owned parks.38 State officials are not fixing a political-process defect
when they threaten to withhold funds from a city that seeks to reduce its own
police budget and shift those monies to social services.39 The state is not solving
a political-process problem when it denies local authority to institute an indoor
masking requirement.40 In all these instances, and in many others, state officials

Chicago ordinance that banned the sale of foie gras to determine whether the ordinance addressed a
“local problem,” despite the broad sweep of the city’s state constitutional grant of home rule power).
35. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (capping property taxes).
36. COLO. CONST. art. 10, § 20 (requiring voter approval for tax changes, among other
limitations on revenue authority).
37. See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What To Do
About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296–97 (2016) [hereinafter Scharff, Powerful Cities].
38. See Richard C. Schragger, Of Crosses and Confederate Monuments: A Theory of Unconstitutional
Government Speech, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 81–89, 97–101 (2021) (recounting recent conflicts over
Confederate monuments and preemption).
39. See, e.g., Karl Etters, Tallahassee and 8 Other Cities File Lawsuit Challenging HB 1 ‘Anti-Riot’ Bill,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 16, 2021, 5:03 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
2021/11/16/tallahassee-8-other-cities-suing-state-over-hb-1-anti-riot-bill/8636987002/ [https://perma.
cc/PY9J-P4N9 (dark archive)] (discussing a recently filed lawsuit against a Florida statute that provides
for removal of local budget authority if cities seek to reduce police funding).
40. See generally Haddow et al., supra note 14 (surveying numerous instances of states preempting
local public health authority during the pandemic); Gartner, supra note 14 (same).
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are not solving but creating political pathologies; in all these cases, they are
acting in a decidedly “counter-majoritarian” fashion.41
Finally, whether the issue is general policy-making, local fiscal capacity,
or the mechanics of local democracy, contemporary home rule generally
vindicates the power of the states in conflicts with local governments. This is
true regardless of the strength or merits of the state concern at issue—the
“immunity” function of home rule.42 Two models have generally taken hold
over the course of the development of home rule. The first is the so-called
imperio approach of protecting “local” or “municipal” matters as to both
initiative and immunity, however contested those terms have been in practice.43
The second is reflected in the American Municipal Association’s (“AMA”) 1953
Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule,44 which broadened the
scope of imperio’s initiative authority while removing what little local
immunity the earlier model had conferred.45 In neither approach, however, is
state preemption meaningfully constrained, although of course one can find
examples of local governments prevailing at the margins.46
While there has certainly not been enough empirical work done on the
consequences of state limitations on local power,47 it would be wrong to dismiss
41. Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1741–43 (2021)
[hereinafter Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures]; see also Paul A. Diller, The Political Process of
Preemption, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 355–81 (2020) [hereinafter Diller, Political Process] (surveying
the variety of ways, such as political geography and gerrymandering, in which contemporary states
stray from majoritarianism and the consequences of this democratic failure for state preemption).
42. See BRIFFAULT ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 33, at 377–97.
The immunity function of home rule involves legal protection for local governments against state
preemption. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1334.
43. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1334. “Imperio” home rule—from the Latin phrase imperium in
imperio—a government within a government—generally refers to systems in which local governments
have both the authority to make policy in the first instance and, at least in theory, supremacy over
contrary state law in matters of local or municipal concern. Id.
44. JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, AM. MUN. ASS’N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953).
45. See id. The basic structure, and purpose, of the AMA Model was to eliminate uncertainty over
what constituted “local” or “municipal” matters that formed the basis for local authority in earlier
imperio models; in exchange for broadening the power of local governments to act in the first instance,
however, the AMA Model empowered states to preempt or structure local power with few constraints.
For this reason, the model is sometimes described as “legislative” home rule for the way it resides the
power to resolve the allocation of state-local power in the state legislature. See Diller, Intrastate
Preemption, supra note 32, at 1125–26.
46. See, e.g., State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Cal.
2012) (holding that the state’s wage law is “a municipal affair” that is governed by a city’s local
ordinances rather than statewide legislation).
47. Interdisciplinary literature is emerging on the consequences of the abuse of state preemption
that underscores, for example, the significantly negative health outcomes that arise in states that tend
to abuse their preemption authority. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Mark Pertschuk, State
Preemption: A Significant and Quiet Threat to Public Health in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
900, 900–02 (2017).
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the reality that the contemporary structure of home rule chills the ability of
local governments to respond to the challenges they undeniably face. This is
true for local-government policy innovation but also for the ability of local
governments to fulfill another critical promise of decentralization—namely
adopting policies that actually prove effective.
The hollowing out of local fiscal capacity, moreover, has distressingly
familiar consequences. This is strikingly evident in the post-industrial Midwest,
where cities like Flint, Michigan, underscore the harms that flow—in Flint’s
case, literally—when local governments do not have the resources to meet even
the most basic needs of their residents.48 But state misstructuring of local
finance has created capacity challenges in many other parts of the country,49 and
the fallout from the current pandemic is likely to exacerbate this hollowing out
significantly.
Contemporary local powerlessness also carries distributional
consequences. Opponents of local power regularly express concerns about
equity; in particular, they worry that local control will allow certain jurisdictions
to use their land use authority to exclude lower-income and minority
populations50—a point we will address further below. But the current structure
of local power in much of the country already reinforces racial, gender, and
socioeconomic disparities. Mayors and other local officials trying to equalize
disparate pay, bolster affordable housing, or broaden civil rights protection have
been stymied in state after state.51 It is notable that state minimum wage
preemption laws were adopted in Georgia, Alabama, Ohio, Louisiana,
Tennessee, and Missouri in direct response to minimum wage efforts in majorityminority cities: Atlanta, Birmingham, Cleveland, New Orleans, Memphis, and
St. Louis.52 Preemption is a leading civil rights issue for these and other cities,
48. See Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, Flint of Outrage, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
155, 159–72 (2017) (recounting the Flint water crisis and its aftermath).
49. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 37, at 312–21.
50. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 5, at 899–910.
51. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 11, at 1999–2008 (discussing new preemption
efforts); Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 11, at 1169–83 (same); Scharff, Hyper
Preemption, supra note 11, at 1494–507 (same).
52. See Georgia Among 21 States Stuck at $7.25 Minimum Wage, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD (July 28,
2017), http://atlantadailyworld.com/2017/07/28/georgia-among-21-state-stuck-at-7-25-minimum-wage
[https://perma.cc/F33K-TMWL] (Atlanta); Zachary Roth, Birmingham Raises Minimum Wage and
Alabama Takes It Away, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
nbcblk/birmingham-raises-minimum-wage-alabama-takes-it-away-n526806 [https://perma.cc/PC86-9
5DM] (Birmingham); Jeremy Pelzer, Gov. John Kasich Signs Bill Blocking Cleveland’s $15 Minimum Wage
Proposal, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 11, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2016/12/
gov_john_kasich_signs_bill_blo.html [https://perma.cc/3YN3-LSPP] (Cleveland); Amelia Morrison
Hipps, Ban on Local ‘Living Wage’ Regs Bound for House Floor, TNREPORT (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://tnreport.com/2013/03/07/ban-on-local-living-wage-regulations-clears-house-committee-tenne
ssee-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/XH9X-LWNP] (Memphis); Michael Isaac Stein, Report: State
Preemption Laws Disproportionately Hurt Women, People of Color, LENS (May 8, 2019), http://thelensnola.
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all of which would arguably prefer self-rule rather than a principle of broad state
powers that might theoretically be used to constrain exclusionary zoning in the
suburbs—something that is unlikely to occur in any of the states that have for
so long targeted majority-minority cities.
B.

A New Partnership Model of Local Authority

How, then, does the NLC’s model constitutional home rule article respond
to these structural concerns? The model draws largely from existing aspects of
home rule across the country in a novel synthesis that seeks to put local
governments in a position that almost none play now—full partnership in state
and local governance.53
The model article is divided into five operative sections with commentary
that explains each provision in detail for any future reform efforts within the
states and for courts considering the often murky application of home-rule
provisions. The first section articulates the core principle that state
constitutional law should recognize the right of the people to local selfgovernment.54 Although that is implicit in state constitutional recognition of
home rule, the model is explicit so as to leave no doubt about its intended scope.
In debates about the state and local balance of power, state sovereignty and the
supposedly plenary authority of state government are often invoked as trumps,
and the model article would make clear that every level of government derives
its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Nothing in contemporary
constitutional law bars the people of a state from exercising the authority to
delegate power in whatever vertical fashion they decide, and the model article
renders the choice to protect local democracy transparent.55
The second section in the model article would bolster the basic terms of
local initiative authority, creating a new baseline for Dillon’s Rule states,
expanding local initiative for imperio states, and clarifying local authority in

org/2019/05/08/report-state-preemption-laws-disproportionately-hurt-women-people-of-color/ [https
://perma.cc/GGS9-7HT2] (New Orleans); David A. Graham, How St. Louis Workers Won and Then
Lost a Minimum-Wage Hike, ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive
/2017/08/st-louis-minimum-wage-preemption/538182/ [http://perma.cc/H54T-UTM8 (dark archive)]
(St. Louis). See generally LAURA HUIZAR & YANNET LATHROP, Fighting Wage Preemption: How
Workers Have Lost Billions in Wages and How We Can Restore Local Democracy (July 2019),
http://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/upload/Fighting-Wage-Preemption-Report-7-19.pdf [http://perma
.cc/452L-HEPR] (showing how preemption of local minimum wage laws “has become a powerful antiworker and anti-democratic policy”).
53. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1341. With one exception, around state fiscal support for
local governance, see id. at 1380–82, the model article draws on elements of home rule currently present
in some form in the states. See id. at 1350–84 (including the model article with commentary).
54. Id. at 1347.
55. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 6–18 (1990) (reviewing the formal structure of local government law in the United States).
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states that have adopted the 1953 AMA Model’s approach.56 The section begins
with the default proposition, similar to the AMA’s, that local governments
should have the authority to act on the entire range of policy matters they face.57
The section also emphasizes the critical need to be clear about the breadth of
local initiative authority around fiscal matters, such as raising and spending
funds, as well as around making choices about how to provide local public goods,
given the centrality of those issues to local capacity to govern.58
The third section in the NLC Model would create a presumption against
state preemption, rebalancing the state-local relationship in the face of currently
weak immunity.59 Some state constitutions proffer procedural approaches to
protect local authority from arbitrary or unreasonable state interference,
requiring state legislative supermajorities, for example, or successive
reenactment to preempt.60 These kinds of procedural protections could provide
a positive foundation for balancing state and local interests on the theory that,
because courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the underlying substance of
preemption conflicts, raising state procedural hurdles at least provides some
check on ill-conceived state interference. In practice, however, courts have
mostly ceded oversight over state legislative process, making these protections
relatively easy for states to evade.61
The NLC Model takes a different approach. As a threshold matter, it
requires that preemption be express,62 as is the case in Illinois and other states.63
This constraint on state oversight responds to the fact that implied-preemption
challenges to local governance often require judicial feats of supposition: Did
the legislature intend to displace local policy when it enacted a state regulatory
regime? Can a political system tolerate some measure of inconsistency between
state and local choices? On what metric? There is simply too much obscurity in

56. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1348. Dillon’s Rule is the doctrine that local governments
derive their authority only from explicit grants of their states and that such grants are to be construed
narrowly. Id. at 1333 n.6; DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 9–10 (2001).
57. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1354–55.
58. Id. The section would also shore up the authority of local governments to act jointly with
other local governments without prior authorization from the state to foster interlocal cooperation.
And to the extent that issues related to home rule will inevitably lead to litigation, the section also
explicitly rejects the Dillon’s Rule restrictive interpretive canon. See id.
59. Id. at 1347–48.
60. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1).
61. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584–85 (N.Y. 1977) (allowing the
state legislature to override the New York Constitution’s successive session requirement where “the
subject matter in need of legislative attention was of sufficient importance to the State”).
62. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1366 (“[T]he state may only rely on express forms of
preemption to restrict the power of home rule governments—implied preemption may not be used.”).
63. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g)–(h); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1366 n.110
(discussing statutory regimes in Florida and Maine that require express preemption).
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various approaches to “field,” “conflict,” or other kinds of implied preemption,
while requirements that state intent be explicit seem workable.
Beyond rejecting implied preemption, this section would require that state
preemption serve a substantial state interest, be narrowly tailored to that
interest, and be enacted by “general law.”64 The first two of these elements
reflect the concept of proportionality so familiar in other areas of law—that
ends must be justified as well as means, and that even legitimate state interests
should displace local authority only to the extent necessary to advance those
interests. Under this substantiality standard, states do bear a burden of
justification—ipse dixit would be insufficient to prevail over local governance—
and something more than lack of uniformity would have to be involved, given
that the essential nature of devolution values regulatory diversity. The
provision would place a burden on the states to articulate relevant state interests
and demonstrate that they are sufficiently significant to warrant displacing local
democracy. To be sure, that empowers courts to adjudicate questions about the
significance of relevant state interests. But courts do so regularly now in statelocal conflicts, only under a standard that presumes as a default matter the
inherent superiority of state-level interests.65
As to the “general law” requirement, a widespread concept in
contemporary state-local relations, the NLC model adapts the approach taken
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Canton v. State.66 According to the Canton
court, the “general law” standard requires that state preemption be part of a
comprehensive legislative enactment, apply uniformly statewide, and further a
state regulatory interest rather than simply remove the authority that a
constitution grants to local governments.67
64. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1366–67.
65. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86
DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1138–39, 1349–55 (2009) (noting that most jurisdictions provide no
“immunity” function for home rule and in the jurisdictions that do, courts seek to delineate statewide
interests, which prevail, in contrast to some realm of local interests).
66. 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002); see PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1370.
67. Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968 (“[T]o constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis,
a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts
of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens
generally.”).
In his critique, Professor Schleicher challenges the invocation of this standard because the
policy at issue in Canton involved local regulation of manufactured homes. Schleicher, supra note 5, at
892 n.49. However, one of the reasons the Canton court was dubious about the state statutory regime
at issue—a critical aspect of the court’s finding of nonuniformity—was that it had a carve-out to allow
parts of the state with active deed restrictions or homeowners associations to block manufactured
homes, effectively barring older cities from regulating issues like housing quality, but empowering
suburbs to be exclusionary. See Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 969.
Professor Schleicher also argues that invoking this standard undermines the ability of states
to declare areas of policy free from regulation, at the state and local level. Schleicher, supra note 5, at

100 N.C. L. REV. 1385 (2022)

2022]

UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE

1399

The fourth section of the model article focuses on protecting and
reinforcing the mechanics of local democracy, which it recognizes as the core of
the core of home rule.68 It would not bar state intervention on issues such as
districting or local personnel but would require that states bear an even higher
burden of justification for overriding these largely internal local processes.69
And it would constitutionally bar the worst excesses of punitive preemption,
providing local governments and local government officials the same immunity
from suit for governmental functions that the state itself enjoys.70
Finally, the fifth section of the model would mandate state fiscal support
for local governance.71 One part of the section adapts existing prohibitions on
unfunded state mandates.72 But building on the concept of state constitutional
mandates of adequacy for education, the section would place a burden on states
to take affirmative steps to make sure that local governments have a minimal
baseline of resources they need to meet the critical governance responsibilities
they carry.73 For example, state constitutional educational provisions have
hardly been a panacea for the shortcomings of public schools, but litigation over
the obligation has prodded some states to take the resource challenges and the
inequity of this particular aspect of delegated local governance more seriously.74
It is important, then, to be clear about what the NLC’s model
constitutional article would and would not do. It would provide a baseline of
authority in state constitutional law for local governments to tackle the full
range of problems they face and structure their own governance. And it would
rebalance the state-local relationship by recognizing that states have obligations
to, as well as power over, local governments. The model article, however, would
not cut off or eliminate state authority, like an imperio approach on steroids.
The model’s presumption against state preemption is just that—a presumption.
It would require states to make conscious choices about displacing local
democracy and have good reasons for doing so rather than simply nakedly
asserting supervening power, but that is the least we can ask of the states. If
California—which has relatively strong home rule for its charter cities, all things
892 n.49. The Ohio general laws standard, however, merely recognizes that singling out local
authority—denying a local choice to act—standing alone undermines the delegation of initiative
authority in the Ohio Constitution. A state may choose not to regulate at the state level and may choose
to regulate in a way that requires uniformity; but to choose neither to act nor to allow local initiative
belies the nature of home rule.
68. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1348.
69. Id. at 1374–75.
70. Id. at 1376.
71. Id. at 1380.
72. Id. at 1382–84.
73. Id.; cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1195–97 (2014)
(discussing dynamics of essential local spending and minimum standards for urban life).
74. See BRIFFAULT ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 33, at 596–635
(surveying state education finance litigation).
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considered—cannot justify a state interest in solving its housing crisis, there
would clearly be something wrong with the state’s approach. Even then, the
NLC framework would still recognize that localism has an important role to
play in statewide regimes that are responding to significant exigencies. What
the model article would no longer allow, however, is states to override local
governance simply because state lawmakers take a different policy view.
II. POLICY AND THE PRINCIPLES
What are the policy implications of the Principles’ proposed rebalancing of
state-local power? Historically, conflicts over the appropriate vertical division
of government authority—whether state-local or state-federal—have tended to
occur against the backdrop of specific events (e.g., the Great Depression75) or
in the shadow of particular policy conflicts (e.g., COVID-19 health
regulations).76 It is very difficult to separate policy preferences from the more
abstract issue of the appropriate distribution of power. The NLC’s home-rule
provisions are transsubstantive; the model rules are meant to provide courts
with rules of decision for allocating authority over a varied range of policy areas.
Nevertheless, one might want to know how a particular policy area might be
resolved under the rules. In this part, we consider a few such areas, using
Professor Schleicher’s critique as a point of departure. He identifies five core
problems that he thinks the NLC’s model home-rule provisions will exacerbate:
housing affordability, abusive corporate subsidies, the pension crisis, local
electoral failure, and police brutality.77
These are important issues, and to have a reasonable debate about how any
particular vertical allocation of authority might or might not foster solving them
is not to ignore their seriousness. But are these problems (or any of the difficult
policy challenges of modern urban governance) actually “local” in nature?
Under the existing structure of authority, states already have the full power to
address all these issues. Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hunter v.
Pittsburgh78 in 1907, cities have had no federal constitutional right to resist state
law, and as noted, the home rule grants they enjoy in state constitutional law
provide very limited immunity.79 States could have addressed all these supposed
locally caused ills long ago if they took them at all seriously. Only state
constitutional bans on “special legislation”80—which have come to be barely
75. See, e.g., 3 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1930–2000, at 155–211 (2019)
(discussing the rise of federal power in response to the Great Depression).
76. See, e.g., Nathan Newman, The Withering Away of the States Can’t Happen Soon Enough, NATION
(Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/federal-states-rights/ [https://perma.cc/
W4GA-2ZUX] (arguing that states have failed to address the COVID-19 pandemic).
77. See Schleicher, supra note 5, at 898–919.
78. 207 U.S. 161.
79. Id. at 178.
80. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
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enforced81—and some other fairly minor restrictions on state authority stand in
the way of legislative action. Other than those thin limits, most state legislatures
can preempt local law basically at will.
So, who is to blame for the policy failures in these disparate areas? Why
have the states not already stepped in to fix them? And why would one resist
city power if the current regime is failing, and in many respects exacerbating,
these problems? We address these questions in turn for each of the policy areas
Schleicher identifies.
A.

Housing Affordability

Consider first the housing affordability crisis. A central concern of critics
of home rule, already mentioned above, is that increased local authority will
stand in the way of greatly needed state efforts to reform local land use laws, in
particular local exclusionary zoning regulations.82 The YIMBY (yes-in-mybackyard) movement that has gained traction in expensive metropolitan areas,
especially in California, seems particularly skeptical of local power.83 Schleicher
reads the entire Principles project through this lens, as have others who
understand local power as inextricably tied to NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard)
land use attitudes. For Schleicher, all local power is suspect because the zoning
power—which has traditionally been exercised by local governments—can be
used by some local governments to limit construction and thus raise the cost of
housing both locally and regionally.84 Racial and socioeconomic segregation is
one result. For these critics, localism and NIMBYism are one-and-the-same.85

81. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality, 51 U. RICH. L.
REV. 489, 497 n.34 (2017) (“[S]tate special legislation has persisted despite these state constitutional
provisions because they tend to be weakly enforced and are riddled with exceptions.”).
82. See, e.g., Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L.
REV. 293, 345–48 (2019) (arguing that pro-development groups will be more successful at the state
level); Kenneth A. Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New Pro-Housing Movement Overcome the Power
of NIMBYs?, 41 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 8 (2018) (suggesting YIMBYs focus reform efforts at the
state level).
83. The YIMBY movement seeks to foster development to respond to the challenges of
constrained supply on housing affordability and related challenges. See Alana Semuels, From ‘Not in
My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard,’ ATLANTIC (July 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-development/532437 [https://perma.cc/9XB8-F7BY
(dark archive)] (profiling the movement); Erin McCormick, Rise of the YIMBYs: The Angry Millennials with
a Radical Housing Solution, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry-millennials-radical-housing-solution [https://perma.cc/A8GDVVLU] (describing the San Francisco Bay Area as “[t]he birthplace of the YIMBY movement”).
84. See Schleicher, supra note 5, at 899–910.
85. For an extended response to this critique, see Richard Schragger, The Perils of Land Use
Deregulation, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (2021) [hereinafter Schragger, Perils of Land Use Deregulation].
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These criticisms of local land use authority are not new. We both have
written (repeatedly) about the deleterious effects of exclusionary zoning.86 So
have other members of the Principles’ drafting team.87 Richard Briffault, in
particular, has written a now-classic article that focuses on the ways in which
suburbs use exclusionary zoning and other tactics to undermine regional equity
and urban health.88
And yet there are some very good reasons for not allowing exclusionary
zoning to be the tail that wags the dog of home rule. First, as already noted, for
at least seventy-five years states have done virtually nothing about exclusionary
zoning, though they have always had the power to do so and even though
reformers have been touting the benefits of regional land use for almost as
long.89 Why the sudden trust in state political processes? In New Jersey, the
state supreme court struck down exclusionary zoning in 1975,90 but the state
legislature’s lackluster efforts to create a fair and equitable housing regime over
the next fifty years have mostly failed.91 Other states that have adopted
statewide land use regimes have also generally failed to ameliorate state and
local housing affordability challenges.92 For instance, Connecticut recently
adopted a much-lauded statewide land use law, but, predictably, that law does
little to change the underlying incentives that lead local governments to adopt
exclusionary zoning.93 The new law also does little to offend the suburban voters

86. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J.
954, 976–77 (2019) [hereinafter Davidson, Dilemma]; Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism:
Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1023–31 (2007); Richard
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1839–42 (2003); Richard Schragger, The
Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 420–24 (2001).
87. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 483, 528
(2007).
88. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,
366–67, 438 (1990).
89. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text; Reynolds, supra note 87, at 484–86.
90. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975).
91. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON
& DAVID N. KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING
AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 184–86 (2013); Joseph Marsico, A Forty-Year
Failure: Why the New Jersey Supreme Court Should Take Control of Mount Laurel Enforcement, 41 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 159–64 (2017).
92. See John R. Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart Growth, 35 URB.
LAW. 15, 67 (2003) (noting that “New Jersey’s aggressive, state-mandated fair share housing policy has
been emulated timidly in just a few states” and that in most states neither regionalism nor reform
movements have succeeded in controlling local planning outcomes); Jessie Agatstein, The Suburbs’ Fair
Share: How California’s Housing Element Law (and Facebook) Can Set a Housing Productions Floor, 44
REAL EST. L.J. 219, 219–20 (2015) (describing how fair share programs have only been “implemented
in a half-dozen states around the country”).
93. See Act of June 10, 2021, Pub. Act 21-29, 2021 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified in scattered
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT.).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1385 (2022)

2022]

UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE

1403

that dominate the Connecticut legislature.94 An early review of California’s
recently adopted S.B. 9, which purports to abolish single-family zoning across
the state, also indicates it will have a limited impact.95
Decentralization is not the cause of the coastal housing crisis; centralizing
land use authority will do little if state and national politicians are responsive
to the same set of voters. Suburban voters are resistant to multifamily housing,
no doubt,96 and this is regrettable. But why limit the power of those cities that
want to adopt affordable housing requirements with the hope that states will
come to the rescue? Past and more recent history shows that to be highly
unlikely.97 And yet the specter of exclusionary zoning continues to haunt home
rule.
Second, while the housing crisis is undoubtedly real and important—
especially in certain popular coastal cities—other cities face the problem of too
much housing, not too little.98 Cities with declining populations are less
concerned about suburban exclusionary zoning and more concerned with their
revenue-raising ability under conditions of perennial fiscal stress.99 Many of us
would agree that suburban selfishness and “opportunity hoarding”100 is a
problem, but “the suburbs” themselves are now much more diverse, both
economically and fiscally.101 Many formerly “exclusionary” suburbs are facing
social and economic difficulties that have nothing to do with exclusionary land
use policies.102
Urban and suburban decline has occurred against a backdrop of state
intergovernmental policy. State law generally dictates how local government
94. See Cate Hewitt, Few See ‘Win,’ as House Approves Less Far-Reaching Housing Law, CONN.
EXAM’R (May 21, 2021), https://ctexaminer.com/2021/05/21/few-see-win-as-house-approves-less-farreaching-housing-law [https://perma.cc/CJ4U-2S5X] (noting lukewarm reactions to the reform
package).
95. See Henry Grabar, You Can Kill Single-Family Zoning, but You Can’t Kill the Suburbs, SLATE
(Sept. 17, 2021, 5:38 PM), https://slate.com/business/2021/09/california-sb9-single-family-zoningduplexes-newsom-housing.html [https://perma.cc/9PLU-Z25K] (citing studies indicating that S.B. 9
will have limited effect); Act of Sept. 16, 2021, ch. 162, 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 66452.6, 65852.21, 66411.7).
96. Cf. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975)
(describing and invalidating suburban fiscal zoning, which limits multifamily housing construction).
97. For more discussion of this point, see Schragger, Perils of Land Use Deregulation, supra note 85,
at 153–60.
98. For more discussion on shrinking cities, see Anderson, supra note 73, at 1138–39.
99. See id.
100. CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 147–69 (1998); see also J. Peter Byrne, Are the
Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2268–69 (1997).
101. See Richard Florida, The New Suburban Crisis, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2017, 10:05 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-02/inside-the-new-suburban-crisis [https://perma.
cc/8AZ6-96G8] (reporting on shrinking inner-ring suburbs and growing cities and suburban
peripheries).
102. ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN CITY
109–12 (2012).
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services are financed. The structure of that fiscal system is one of the chief
reasons that local governments deploy exclusionary zoning. States have created
a system by which local governments are dependent on the property tax to fund
basic services, including, most importantly, schools. State law dictates how
jurisdictional boundaries are drawn and what kinds of taxable resources are
available to which communities. State law limits local governments’ revenue
sources as well as the taxability of services and land, enforces debt and spending
limitations that often hamstring local governments, and imposes unfunded
mandates.103 States could adopt revenue sharing, but they do not. These state
policies have led to the “fiscalization” of land use104—the effort by locals to use
what powers they have over zoning to control their fiscal fates.
And that is before we consider state laws that prevent local governments
from adopting inclusionary housing policies or make it difficult for them to
build affordable housing themselves.105 Those state laws are currently on the
books106 and do more to restrict local housing opportunities than a home rule
principle that might bar the currently theoretical statewide deregulatory zoning
laws that some YIMBY advocates seem to believe are just around the corner.
Indeed, we should be very clear that the use of “might” here is purposeful:
nothing in the Principles prevents the state from overriding local land use laws
if the state can meet its burden of proving that the state is advancing a
substantial state interest. A statewide housing crisis would certainly meet that
standard.
Third, cities are responding to the new YIMBY politics. It is difficult to
understand the claim that cities cannot be trusted to respond to the housing
crisis when housing is such a pivotal political issue in places like San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and New York107—not to mention in places like Charlottesville
and Richmond.108 The argument assumes that local citizens and their elected
103. Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 860 (2012) [hereinafter
Schragger, Democracy and Debt]; David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544,
2549 & n.21 (2005); Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911–12 (2003).
104. Jonathan Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization
of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 201–04 (1997).
105. See, e.g., Act of April 19, 2021, ch. 249, 2021 Mont. Laws 736 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 7-2-4203, 76-2-203, -302 (2022)); Nora Shelly, Bill To Ban Inclusionary Zoning Heard by Montana
Senate Committee, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.bozemandaily
chronicle.com/news/city/bill-to-ban-inclusionary-zoning-heard-by-montana-senate-committee/article
_9cf6ed36-c428-58cd-bd0d-871e3c01d4c2.html [https://perma.cc/7C2G-VZXC].
106. State Preemption of Local Equitable Housing Policies, LOC. SOLS. SUPPORT CTR.,
https://www.supportdemocracy.org/equitablehousing/ [https://perma.cc/NSR2-8GDP].
107. For a discussion of San Francisco in particular, see, for example, CONOR DOUGHERTY,
GOLDEN GATES: FIGHTING FOR HOUSING IN AMERICA (2020) (describing pro-housing coalitions
in San Francisco).
108. See, e.g., Sarah King, The Housing Gap, RICHMOND MAG. (May 21, 2019, 5:03 PM),
https://richmondmagazine.com/news/news/housing_1/ [https://perma.cc/D9C3-NCSM]; CJ Paschall,

100 N.C. L. REV. 1385 (2022)

2022]

UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE

1405

officials will rarely or never permit increased development or density and that
only enlightened statewide coalitions will be able to force changes on
recalcitrant cities and suburbs.
There is no reason, however, to believe that local coalitions to expand
housing opportunities cannot be constructed at the municipal level or that prohousing constituencies will somehow be systematically ignored. Indeed, a large
body of literature argues that developer interests are well represented in mature
cities as well as in developing suburban and rural municipalities,109 even if some
suburban municipalities are decidedly antigrowth and will effectively remain
so. If housing advocates can win at the local level, taking away locals’ power to
shape land use is exactly the opposite of what one should do, especially in light
of the history of state inaction and the power of NIMBY forces in state politics.
This leads to a final observation. When one thinks about the pros and cons
of home rule, the kind of place one imagines exercising it matters a lot.
Exclusionary suburbs have been the focus of metropolitan reform efforts for at
least half a century. That effort is not wrong, but it is far from the whole picture.
Those kinds of places may—and likely will—succeed in excluding regardless of
state law, as the New Jersey experience proves. But by building one’s concept
of local power around that archetype, which increasingly fails to represent the
reality of suburban socioeconomics and demographics,110 we limit the exercise
of power in the very places that have traditionally been injured by suburban
exclusion: cities and inner-ring suburbs, many of which are actively seeking
solutions to housing affordability and displacement challenges. Restricting local
power in this, as in other areas, will hurt the very places that YIMBY advocates
want to help.

Report: Charlottesville Affordable Housing Crisis Disproportionately Affects Black People, NBC, https://www
.nbc29.com/2020/03/13/report-charlottesville-affordable-housing-crisis-disproportionately-affects-bla
ck-people/ [https://perma.cc/VR47-FS73 (staff-uploaded archive)] (Mar. 13, 2020, 11:18 AM);
Benjamin Schneider, The American Housing Crisis Might Be Our Next Big Political Issue, BLOOMBERG
(May 16, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/is-housing-americas-next-bigpolitical-issue/560378/ [https://perma.cc/84VG-HLGQ].
109. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987); Andrew E.G. Jonas & David Wilson, The City as a Growth Machine:
Critical Reflections Two Decades Later, in THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES,
TWO DECADES LATER 3, 3 (Andrew E.G. Jonas & David Wilson eds., 1999); H.V. SAVITCH & PAUL
KANTOR, CITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 348 (2002); Harvey Molotch, The
City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOCIO. 309, 309–10 (1976).
110. Over the past two decades, poverty in the United States has become an increasingly suburban
phenomenon, with over three million more people living in poverty in the suburbs than in traditional
central cities as of 2015. See Elizabeth Kneebone, The Changing Geography of US Poverty, BROOKINGS
INST. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-changing-geography-of-us-poverty/
[https://perma.cc/8JTH-6HRY].
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Corporate Subsidies, Pension Crises, Local Elections, and Police Misconduct

Similar arguments hold for the other policy areas identified by
Schleicher111 that appear to be “local” but are in fact driven mainly by state law
and politics. Home rule has little to do with the abuse of corporate subsidies,
the pension crisis, local electoral entrenchment, or police misconduct. States
already dominate in these areas or would likely govern no differently than
locals—or do much worse. In these policy arenas, the centralization/decentralization debate is mostly beside the point.
Indeed, it bears repeating that, as with housing affordability, these other
policy challenges persist despite the states’ current plenary authority over cities.
Moreover, these challenges are not new; similar ones served as an excuse to
limit local power in the late nineteenth century as well. Blaming cities for these
types of failures while not readily providing a solution has been something of a
tradition over the last century. It is much easier to limit local authority than it
is to actually address the difficult substantive issues that afflict both states and
local governments. Here we consider corporate subsidies and the pension crisis,
local elections, and police misconduct in turn.
1. Corporate Subsidies and the Pension Crisis
First, consider corporate subsidies and the pension crisis. Both involve the
comparative fiscal probity of state and local governments. To critics, cities have
always been too ready to provide subsidies for corporations, whether railroads,
automobile manufacturers, or Amazon.112 So too, for critics, cities have often
been overly generous with their public pensions. John Dillon, the nineteenthcentury jurist who articulated the rule of strict construction limiting local
government powers,113 notably centered his constitutional theory on the
proposition that cities could not be trusted to exercise fiscal restraint.114 Dillon’s
Rule—the doctrine that cities derive their authority only from explicit grants
by their states115—still bears his name. Dillon’s worry that cities will be

111. See Schleicher, supra note 5, at 883.
112. See Schragger, Democracy and Debt, supra note 103, at 866–67; Reid Wilson, States, Cities
Rethink Tax Incentives After Amazon HQ2 Backlash, HILL (Feb. 17, 2020, 2:15 PM), https://thehill.com/
homenews/state-watch/483127-states-cities-rethink-tax-incentives-after-amazon-hq2-backlash [http://
perma.cc/4YDR-WE3H].
113. See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868); JOHN
F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101–02 (1872).
114. DILLON, supra note 113, at 21–26; RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 61–65 (2016) [hereinafter SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER]; Gerald E.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1117–18 (1980).
115. See DILLON, supra note 113, at 21–26.
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profligate spenders unless constrained has been and continues to be
commonplace.116
Of course, as Dillon well knew, it was not only cities that overextended
themselves. Numerous states in the nineteenth century defaulted after
committing to bond issues to finance railroad and other infrastructure
investments.117 More recently, the federal programs that fell under the rubric of
“urban renewal” in the mid-twentieth century were only possible because of the
availability of state and federal funds. Urban renewal funds often subsidized
downtown commercial redevelopment at the expense of local low-income
minority communities, who were regularly displaced.118 But it is important to
remember that without federal support, locals would not have been able to
afford subsidizing redevelopment at such a scale. Similarly, state monies
underwrote the exercise of eminent domain in the famous Kelo v. New London119
takings case, which involved tax breaks and other incentives to induce Pfizer to
relocate to New London.120 And one need only look at the Amazon HQ2 bids
to realize that most giveaways in that competition were not out of purely local
dollars. Virginia voted to give $750 million to the project in Arlington.121 New
York was slated to give nearly $3 billion in state funding to its Amazon bid.122
If cities were left alone, they might still engage in useless races-to-thebottom in the hunt for mobile capital, but certainly not on the scale or to the
degree that states currently do. Cities would have to internalize the costs of
their bids to their own taxpayers, which might be quite difficult when the costs
and benefits of the project are concentrated.
Moreover, city constituents seem more attentive than state officials to the
trade-offs of having a good “business climate.” Corporate interests seem to have

116. Cf. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 114, at 61–65 (describing the policy concerns that
led to Dillon’s Rule).
117. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC MONEY AND AMERICAN CITIES
25–26 (1995). Monkkonen reports that there were approximately 941 municipal bond defaults between
1854 and 1929, with a peak of 111 in 1898. Bond defaults rose by orders of magnitude during the Great
Depression, peaking in 1935 with 3,251 defaults. See id.
118. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 13–21 (2003) (describing how the national rhetoric
around “urban blight” facilitated urban renewal and the use of eminent domain by national planning
organizations).
119. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
120. Id. at 473.
121. Robert McCartney, Virginia House Approves $750 Million in Amazon Subsidies After
9 Minutes of Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/virginia-house-approves-750-million-in-amazon-subsidies-after-9-minutes-of-debate/2019/01/
28/ac1a40ac-2334-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/W5TD-VEYP (dark archive)].
122. Emily Badger, In the End, Amazon Didn’t Win Its Own Subsidy Game, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2019), https://nyti.ms/2UZs1si [https://perma.cc/766A-CWU7 (dark archive)].
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significant sway in state capitols these days.123 Industries from across the
spectrum, from telecommunications to oil and gas to firearms, have effectively
lobbied state legislatures for preemptive legislation and have successfully
fended off local regulation time and time again.124 Cities are more likely to adopt
minimum wage requirements and reject giveaways to corporate capital (as locals
did in New York City, thereby prompting Amazon to abandon that aspect of
its HQ2 plans).125 Locals are not the ones we should be most worried about
when it comes to corporate subsidies.
As for the pension crisis, there too, states are no better off than cities,126
and perhaps for the same reasons. A previously large municipal workforce is
now getting old, while the local tax base is smaller and not as capable of
supporting retirees in the way that was once taken for granted. Some pensions
are quite generous, but some that have been described as overly generous are
not. Detroit is in the latter category.127 Its pension problems are serious, to be
sure. But what is the cause? In 1950, the city housed close to 1.8 million people
and was at the height of its powers.128 It has since lost more than half of its
population to deindustrialization, suburbanization, and migration to other
states.129 The city may have made bad deals, but the fiscal crisis in Detroit is
largely a function of global economic restructuring and demographic change,
not bad governance.130 Those macroeconomic factors swamp any decisions made
by either local or state leaders.
In any case, state law often entrenches pension commitments to municipal
employees (police and firefighters are a common example); those commitments
must be honored by local governments.131 For those interested in preserving
123. See ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW CONSERVATIVE
ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESSES, AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPE THE AMERICAN STATES—AND
THE NATION 13–14 (2019) (describing strategies corporations employ to ensure their priorities end up
as state law).
124. Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 11, at 1170–74.
125. J. David Goldman, Amazon Pulls Out of Planned New York Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2019), https://nyti.ms/2UYaeSh [https://perma.cc/GCP7-YMDG (dark archive)].
126. See, e.g., Patrick Mulholland, Pension Crisis: US Seeks To Save Flawed State Benefits System, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/758b6709-1d05-4feb-8206-e902f52f6696 [https://
perma.cc/8LZ5-DJTS (dark archive)] (discussing Illinois’s underfunded pension system that has left
firefighters concerned about their ability to retire).
127. See Melanie Hicken, Just How Generous Are Detroit’s Pensions?, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2013,
7:04 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/07/23/retirement/detroit-pensions/index.html [https://perma
.cc/UP79-YNPN] (explaining that Detroit’s pensions “pale in comparison” to other cites).
128. William Sander & William Testa, Why Chicago Is Not Detroit, FED. RSRV. BANK CHI.:
MIDWEST ECON. BLOG (May 2, 2016), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/blogs/midwesteconomy/2016/why_chicago_is_not_detroit [https://perma.cc/6LL8-RYE9].
129. Id.; see SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 114, at 238–46 (discussing the reasons for
Detroit’s decline).
130. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 114, at 240.
131. See Terrance O’Reilly, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics and Law, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 183, 195–99 (2014) (detailing the legal status of public employee pension benefits).
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local fiscal probity, one would think that a preemption standard preventing
these kinds of state fiscal mandates would be welcome. The Principles in fact
embodies that very idea.
2. Local Elections
The pathologies of local elections also worry critics of local power.
Schleicher, for example, argues that local political processes are dominated by
influential interest groups including, most powerfully, homeowners.132 Because
local elections are low turnout affairs that favor whiter and richer constituencies,
the argument goes, giving local governments authority to adopt their own
electoral processes is illegitimate. The concern with local political pathologies
is not unreasonable, but again, the question when thinking about home rule is:
Compared to what? The claim must be that local political processes are
somehow worse than state processes.
But this claim is puzzling in light of the obvious deficiencies of state and
federal elections—dominated as they are by big money donors and also
disproportionately favoring whiter and richer voters.133 So, too, state democratic
processes are easily captured by corporate interests and by parties seeking to
entrench their own dominance. If one is worried about democratic integrity,
then one should be focused on state electoral policy. The epidemic of voter
suppression is not a local one. States are at the vanguard of restricting the
franchise and limiting participation in various ways.134 Indeed, many of the
states that have been most aggressive in preempting local governments have the
least representative legislatures.135
The reality is that local elected office is more accessible than state or
federal office. The cost to run for school board or city council is typically less

132. Schleicher, supra note 5, at 911. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 39 (2001) (arguing that zoning is crucial to motivating
homebuyers to “vote with their feet” because it advances capitalization).
133. Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens
United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 646–50 (2011); Maggie Koerth, How Money Affects
Elections, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 10, 2018, 5:56 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/moneyand-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ [https://perma.cc/UN98-9EEW].
134. See Block the Vote: How Politicians Are Trying To Block Voters from the Ballot Box, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/block-the-vote-voter-suppression-in-2020/ [http://perma.cc
/GD8W-7XAP] (Aug. 18, 2021) (cataloguing state use of voter ID laws, voter registration restrictions,
voter roll purges, and felony disenfranchisement laws). Many of the states that have been breaking
preemption norms have the least representative legislatures. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric
M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 836–37 (2015);
see also Diller, Political Process, supra note 41, at 362.
135. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 41, at 1791–94; Diller, Political Process,
supra note 41, at 362; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 836–37 (2015).
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than $1,000 and even in large districts does not normally exceed $25,000.136 To
run for Congress, one would need, on average, more than $1,000,000.137
Moreover, the fact of low voter turnout is not a reason to deny local power. The
causation might in fact be exactly backwards. Why vote when the city can
exercise little authority over the things that matter to it? Participation in local
elections would likely increase if locals could exercise greater powers. Consider
again majority-minority cities. Home rule enhances the power of traditionally
disenfranchised groups in those cities. State officials know this, which is why
they are systematically undermining home rule in those states with large
minority urban populations.138
Electoral reform is a relatively easy case for deferring to local control.
Electoral politics at the state and national levels are dominated by a narrow
donor class, and states have been notoriously quick to upend local democratic
institutions. They used “ripper” bills in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to reverse local electoral outcomes that they did not like. These
“rippers” literally eliminated local offices or removed local officials in part
because state political machines were using municipal offices to reward their
own political supporters.139 Today, those forms of state intervention are seen as
wildly inappropriate.
Nevertheless, states still have the power to seize cities and sideline their
elected officials in cases of fiscal crisis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of those
cities that have been placed into state receivership are predominantly Black and
poor.140 Some states are also adopting preemptive laws that permit the removal
of local elected officials when those officials disagree with state policy or that

136. Sarah Reckhow, Jeffrey R. Henig, Rebecca Jacobsen & Jamie Alter Litt, “Outsiders with Deep
Pockets”: The Nationalization of Local School Board Elections, 53 URB. AFFS. REV. 783, 784 (2017)
(“Studies of school board campaigns suggest that candidates typically spend less than $1000; candidates
in large districts often spend more, although 90% of candidates in large districts reported spending less
than $25,000.” (citation omitted)).
137. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE DATA SUMMARY TABLES tbl.4
(2019), http://www.fec.gov/resources/campaign-finance-statistics/2018/tables/congressional/ConCand
4_2018_24m.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EYH-K5EZ] (including calculations for the “24-Month Median
Receipts of Senate and House Candidates from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018”).
138. Kriston Capps, The Cities That Are Fighting Back Against State Intervention, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
3, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-03/cities-struggle-to-resiststate-preemption-laws [https://perma.cc/4KM4-4K5B]; see, e.g., Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d
1282, 1283 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that an equal protection challenge to a legislative preemption of a
city’s minimum wage law stated a claim), on reh’g en banc, 944 F.3d 1287, 1288 (2019) (dismissing for
lack of standing).
139. Briffault, Voting Rights, supra note 12, at 805–06; Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict
Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1125–26 (2012).
140. Kossis, supra note 139, at 1115–20, 1134–37; Schragger, Democracy and Debt, supra note 103, at
879 n.80, 881; Julie Bosman & Monica Davey, Anger in Michigan over Appointing Emergency Managers,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/us/anger-in-michigan-overappointing-emergency-managers.html?smid=url-share [http://perma.cc/2RT2-QAGY (dark archive)].
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impose personal liability on those same officials.141 These laws constitute the
modern version of ripper bills. State law also denies cities the ability to adopt
ranked-choice voting, to encourage same-day registration, to extend the
franchise to nonresidents or to residents under eighteen, or to adopt campaign
finance laws.142 These efforts represent the undermining of democratic
government, not its enhancement.
3. Police Reform
The final example we consider is police reform. Enhanced home rule, it
could be argued, will prevent states from reforming recalcitrant and abusive
local police departments. But here again, a comparative perspective is required.
Why are states better equipped to address the problem of racially
discriminatory and abusive policing? State police are no more immune to the
problem of racialized policing than local police. State oversight of local police
through training and other programs is already commonplace; no one is
suggesting that these administrative mechanisms be jettisoned. Again, it is not
at all clear what policing abuse has to do with home rule. The NLC provisions
do not say anything about the violation of constitutional or civil rights;143
whatever preemption presumptions one adopts, the state and federal
constitutions must apply and are arguably a clearer lens through which to
address police abuses.
More importantly, the claim that a stronger preemption standard would
exacerbate our national policing failures is odd in light of the role that the states
have played in creating the carceral state. Overcriminalization has been an
almost exclusively state affair.144 State legislatures are responsible for adopting
the punitive and racially charged laws that have led to overincarceration. States
fund the elaborate penal system—the prosecutors, judges, guards, and parole
officers—that enforces those laws. States fund the prisons used to house their
huge incarcerated populations.145 That prison-industrial complex is zealously
backed by unions that exercise much of their power in the state legislature.146
And state laws are responsible for suspending driver’s licenses for unpaid fines
141. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1368; Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 11, at 2002–04.
142. See Joshua Douglas, The Right To Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1052–
69 (2017); David M. Faherty, The Post-Crawford Rise in Voter ID Laws: A Solution Still in Search of a
Problem, 66 ME. L. REV. 269, 286–87 (2013).
143. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 1 (detailing the list of provisions and principles that may
constitute a model constitutional home rule).
144. Erika Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 710–12 (2005); see
also JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 1–20 (2017).
145. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–19
(2019) (describing the prison industrial complex).
146. For a discussion on the prison-industrial complex, see JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST
BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA (2011).
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and fees and for disenfranchising former offenders.147 As with corporate subsidy
abuse, if local governments had to internalize the costs of incarceration, they
would undoubtedly make different choices.
To be sure, local police departments can and do engage in racial profiling
and abusive stop-and-frisk practices.148 There is nothing in the Principles that
prevents these practices from being outlawed by the state, and yet it is notable
that states seem in no rush to do so. In Virginia, for years state law prevented
local police civilian review boards from exercising any power at all.149 And when
Nashville instituted a community oversight board in 2019 that had the authority
to investigate police misconduct, the Tennessee legislature responded by
stripping citizen boards of their authority to issue subpoenas.150
Certainly, there have also been prominent examples of local governments
relying heavily on the fines and fees imposed for local traffic and municipal
code violations. Ferguson, Missouri, is the best-known case: a Department of
Justice inquiry found that Ferguson relied heavily on revenue from municipal
code violations to fund city government, pressured the police department to
issue as many citations as possible, and incarcerated people who could not afford
to pay the fines and fees imposed without a determination of their ability to
pay.151 Excessive fines and fees can be a significant problem, but here too,
nothing in the Principles prevents the state from imposing limitations on the use
of those kinds of measures.
Moreover—and again this needs to be emphasized—the fiscalization of
criminal justice, like the fiscalization of land use, is a feature of a state-created
147. See Meghan Keneally, ‘It’s Not America’: 11 Million Go Without a License Because of Unpaid Fines,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:11 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/vicious-cycle-11-million-livedrivers-license-unpaid/story?id=66504966 [https://perma.cc/6P9D-YHCG]; Priya Sarathy Jones &
Jonathan Ben-Menachem, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR., Free To Drive (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:36 PM), https://
www.freetodrive.org/maps/#page-content [https://perma.cc/22UA-D9MN] (noting the presence of
such laws in forty-two states and the District of Columbia).
148. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
New York City’s “stop and frisk” policies unconstitutional).
149. See Geremia Di Maro, Police Civilian Review Board Looks To Expand Its Powers as It Begins To
Develop Working Bylaws, CAVALIER DAILY (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.cavalierdaily.com/
article/2018/09/police-civilian-review-board-looks-to-expand-its-powers-as-it-begins-to-develop-work
ing-bylaws [https://perma.cc/X924-J9MY]; Charlotte Rene Woods & Elliott Robinson, Charlottesville
Civilian Review Board Finds Its Footing, CHARLOTTESVILLE TOMORROW (June 28, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://www.cvilletomorrow.org/articles/charlottesville-civilian-review-board-finds-its-footing/ [https
://perma.cc/YG7W-9MCD].
150. Act of May 8, 2019, ch. 320, 2019 Tenn. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis) (codified
at TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-8-312(b)(1) (2022)).
151. CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2–4, 9–15 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5PL-V6GS]; Joseph
Shapiro, In Ferguson, Court Fines and Fees Fuel Anger, NPR (Aug. 25, 2014, 5:56 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger [https://perma.cc/27A5-S
PWF].
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system that provides little assistance to economically struggling municipalities.
Fines and fees are ways that local governments fund their services. Local
governments will use the limited tools they have to raise revenue when they are
otherwise restricted by state law, as cities are under many state statutes and
constitutions.
The Principles seeks to address this problem of fiscalization directly, which
is again state created. It has been too easy for states to engage in what scholars
have called “scalar dumping”: pushing social welfare responsibilities down onto
vulnerable local governments while not funding those responsibilities.152 States
are as complicit or more in the fiscalization of local policy in the area of criminal
justice, as they are in so many others. Taking power away from local
governments is not going to solve that central problem.
III. IDEOLOGY AND HOME RULE
It is not surprising that readers will view the Principles through their own
policy preoccupations. They may wonder what the implications of those rules
are for their current cause célèbre. We are a little surprised, however, when
critics treat their lists of favored policy outcomes as if they are conclusive of the
wrongs of local power when there are ample policy concerns that point in the
other direction. Proponents of state land use reform have their list of favored
policy reforms. But so do advocates across the policy spectrum. The criteria for
picking one or the other set of reforms is not at all clear.
The hostility to localism everywhere across the board thus suggests that
something more is at work other than a commitment to the best policy outcome
all things considered. Consider the proliferation of punitive preemption in the
states, much of which has targeted local regulatory efforts.153 The NLC has
engaged in extensive study of the phenomenon and has found that local
governments are being strangled by state law across literally dozens of policy
areas.154 States are preempting local policies that address fracking, global
warming and environmental poisoning, public health, and paid sick leave.155
States prevent cities from regulating ride-sharing, adopting congestion pricing,
enforcing a minimum wage, or providing broadband services.156 States have
eliminated the possibility for cities to regulate tobacco and firearms, to adopt
152. See Yunji Kim & Mildred E. Warner, Shrinking Local Autonomy: Corporate Coalitions and the
Subnational State, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 427, 433 (2018).
153. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nestor Davidson, Paul A. Diller, Olatunde Johnson & Richard C.
Schragger, The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progressive Cities and How Cities Can
Respond, 11 ADVANCE 3, 3–4 (2017); Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 11, at 1999; Davidson,
Dilemma, supra note 86, at 958; Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 11, at 1169; Scharff,
Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1469.
154. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1337–39.
155. See Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 11, at 1169, 1171, 1173–74, 1182, 1199–200.
156. Id. at 1172, 1174, 1187.
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LGBTQ antidiscrimination laws, or to legislate consumer protection policies.157
States drastically limit local revenue raising capacity while also imposing
onerous unfunded mandates.158
Should we adopt a state-local regime that allows states to preempt all local
land use regulations because housing is so important, even if that principle also
permits states to preempt all local minimum wage laws, plastic bag bans, and
antidiscrimination laws? Critics of the local land use power do not give us a
reason to trade off one set of local policies for another. They do not perform
any weighing of the costs and benefits of the policies that would be permitted
under home rule against the policies that would be barred. If one is a
consequentialist, one would need to know whether these policies will better
advance social welfare in the aggregate. And how would one know without a
great deal of analysis?
What we do know, under current conditions of uncertainty, is that state
supremacy, which characterizes our present regime, has not effectively
addressed the problems that we all agree require attention. If that is the case,
why stick with the present regime?
That conclusion seems decisive, though it does not entirely end the
inquiry. One could take a “do no harm” approach and argue that a more robust
home rule regime with a more rigorous preemption standard will exacerbate
those problems. But that conclusion is unsupported. It first requires one to
discount all the policies that cities would have adopted had those policies not
been overridden by their states. And second, it depends on a comparative claim,
one that pits the supposed deficiencies of local political processes against the
supposed benefits of state political processes.
That inquiry is ongoing. There is ample literature extolling the benefits of
federalism, devolution, decentralization, and subsidiarity—terms that all mean
slightly different things but tend to point in a similar direction. In the field of
local government law, advocates of increasing local power have two main
(though somewhat incompatible) orientations. There are those who champion
local government from a civic-republican (and anticorporate) perspective,
celebrating the virtues of smaller-scale, participatory democracy.159 And there
are those who champion local government from a law-and-economics
perspective, extolling the virtues of interjurisdictional competition and the
benefits of the local provision of public goods.160 The former approach
emphasizes democratic accountability; the latter perspective emphasizes
157. See id. at 1171, 1177, 1224.
158. Id. at 1169.
159. See Frug, supra note 114, at 1065–66, 1071–73.
160. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956);
see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 267, 282–83 (1998).
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efficiency. The NLC model provisions are not explicitly committed to either
perspective, though both provide theoretical support.
That said, the primary justification for the revised NLC provisions is the
hope to finally accomplish what the long history of home-rule reform in the
United States has not. The NLC provisions are built on a preexisting edifice of
Progressive Era reform (that included home rule and bans on special
legislation)—all of which have been efforts over time to insulate cities from
oftentimes pathological state politics.161
Moreover, as noted, the NLC model constitutional article is based on a
problem-solving theory of intergovernmental relations. That theory goes
something like this: In a complex urban society, municipal government has the
means, capacity, and need to govern in the first instance through municipal law.
That is because local officials are no less capable of making important policy
judgments than are state officials and it is both inefficient and undemocratic for
cities to have to seek permission from the state to act. While the state obviously
also has interests and expertise and should act when necessary to do so, it should
not displace local law simply because state officials have a different policy
preference. Instead, state officials should give reasons supported by evidence
for why it is necessary to displace local law. This standard enhances
responsiveness and accountability. It also ensures a reasonable division of
authority between state and local and limits unjustified intrusions into local
decision-making.
At the heart of this pragmatic division of labor is a conception of local selfgovernment as being more attractive than government from afar. If local
governments are seriously deficient, either because they are systematically less
accountable or have less expertise, then a presumption against preemption
might not make sense. There is, however, no reason to think that cities are more
deficient than states or the federal government, and there is some reason to
think that they are much less. Indeed, the federal and state governments’
response to the COVID-19 pandemic throughout much of the crisis illustrates
the significant harms that accompany incompetence and corruption at the top,
even if federal support for the development of vaccines is a reminder of the kind
of issue that bears centralization. And while governors often showed leadership
during the pandemic, too many acted precipitously and contrary to the interests
of their urban residents when preempting local social distancing orders, masking
requirements, and other basic public health measures.162 As for state legislatures,
161. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 114, at 56–77.
162. See, e.g., Daniel E. Slotnik, Adeel Hassan & Bryan Pietsch, Texas Governor Will Bar Local
Governments from Requiring Masks., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/18/world/texasgovernor-local-mask-mandates.html [https://perma.cc/5LYP-62RR (dark archive)] (Aug. 14, 2021).
For a summary of state preemptive health regulations, see Preemption of Public Health Authority, LOC.
SOL. SUPPORT CTR. (June 25, 2021), https://www.supportdemocracy.org/issuespecific-preemption-
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the evidence that state political pathologies are pervasive is extensive.163 State
legislatures are gerrymandered and unrepresentative, they are often captured
by special interests, and they are regularly hostile to their cities.164
In light of these failures of centralization, one has to wonder what is
driving the hostility to cities, especially when critics provide no real
comparative analysis of state and local democracy. Many years ago, Professor
Joan Williams observed that conflicts over city status and authority mainly
serve as placeholders for ideological conflicts and interests having nothing to do
with the city qua city.165 Local power is vulnerable, she noted, to the extent it
can be deployed or denigrated to pursue other aims.166
An example is the YIMBY objection to the Principles’ enhanced home rule.
As previously noted, an increasingly vocal constituency, mainly in high-demand
coastal cities, want local governments to stop regulating the housing market on
the assumption that the “free market” will correct the supply bottleneck that
has contributed to coastal regional housing crises.167 This emphasis on
deregulation is notable. For most YIMBYs, it actually does not matter which
level of government is regulating housing. State exclusionary policies are no
more legitimate than local ones, and federal laws that prevent construction are
as bad as any others. YIMBYs are not seeking out some workable
intergovernmental system under conditions of political disagreement. At this
historical moment, local government appears to be more of a threat to a
preferred policy outcome. Presumably when states become a threat, the YIMBY
perception of the advisability of local power will change. In this way, YIMBY
arguments against local power are derivative, serving particular goals having
nothing to do with intergovernmental relations.
This conclusion perhaps should come as no surprise, insofar as it tracks the
intellectual history of state-municipal relations. As we have already noted,
intergovernmental reforms across the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries
guides/preemption-of-public-health-authority [https://perma.cc/FE3P-XLVV]. For a suggestive study
that considers the relationship between city autonomy and pandemic responsiveness in the fourteenth
century, see Han Wang & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Local Institutions and Pandemics: City Autonomy and
the Black Death, 136 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY, Nov. 2021, at 1 (finding that mortality rates from the
plague were lower in cities with higher levels of political autonomy).
163. See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1594–95 (2019); Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 41, at 1762–76; Miriam
Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (2019); see also Diller,
Political Process, supra note 41, at 363–64. See generally HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 123 (describing
how conservativism has captured state legislatures); JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE
DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE (2019) (describing how geography has
disadvantaged the Democratic Party).
164. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 41, at 1750–56.
165. See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics
of City Status in American Law, 1986 WISC. L. REV. 83, 85–87.
166. Id.
167. See supra Section II.A.
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responded to particular policy concerns. For John Dillon, the problem of
economic favoritism was paramount. Chastened by state and local bond defaults
during the mid- to late-1800s, Dillon’s Rule was designed to limit government’s
collusion with special interests: the corrupt giveaways of grants and special
privileges to the street railways, and gas, water, and electric companies.168 Like
many classical jurists, Dillon distrusted government and tasked the courts with
policing the line between appropriate public and private interests.169
Thomas Cooley—the nineteenth-century jurist who embraced an inherent
right of local self-government—also worried about government’s inclination to
show economic favoritism.170 But he believed that the state legislature was a
more likely source of those ills than were local governments. For Cooley, the
central problem was the influence of the “great and wealthy corporations”;171
state legislatures were violating the public trust by favoring those interests.172
To be sure, turn-of-the-century reformers had their pick of “corrupt”
governments: state legislatures were no “cleaner” than municipal governments
in an era of Tammany Hall.173 Revisionist historians, in fact, have argued that
municipal government in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
centuries was an “unheralded triumph,”174 not the failure it is sometimes
characterized to be.
Many reform-minded Progressives agreed. Consider Frederic Howe,
member of the Cleveland City Council and author of The City: The Hope of
Democracy.175 Howe had no illusions about the quality of city governance, but
he believed that state supremacy was the central problem, not city
independence. Howe pointed out that municipal democracy had never really
been tried. Rather, state political machines worked in tandem with local leaders
to take advantage of the spoils available in the newly industrializing cities.
Progressive Era reformers needed to free the municipalities from corrupt state
control first. Only then could they work on reforming and improving municipal
government.176
168. See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868); DILLON,
supra note 113, at 101–02.
169. Cf. Williams, supra note 165, at 86–100 (discussing Dillon’s Rule).
170. See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring);
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 261–63 (7th ed. 1903).
171. COOLEY, supra note 170, at 393 n.1.
172. Cf. HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 123 (discussing contemporary corporate capture of state
legislatures).
173. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA, 1870–1900, at 305 (1984) (discussing Tammany).
174. See id. at 307–13.
175. FREDERIC C. HOWE, THE CITY: THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY, at vii (1905).
176. Cf. Robert C. Brooks, Metropolitan Free Cities: A Thoroughgoing Municipal Home Rule Policy, 30
POL. SCI. Q. 222, 226 (1915) (“Under existing conditions great cities have to seek their legislative
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Critics of city power—our modern-day Dillons—have their own favored
set of policy ills, which, like Dillon, they place entirely at the feet of local
government. But maybe there is a lurking distrust of all government here.
Perhaps the critics of city power are unearthing classical constitutional theories
in more than just their distrust of the city. For his part, Schleicher seems to
embrace a public choice theorist’s skepticism of government—the suspicion that
all governments are prone to special interest capture and that all regulation is
some form of rent seeking. The classical theorists also distrusted government
regulation—perhaps for similar reasons; they were the primogenitors of laissezfaire.
This brings us full circle, back to the jurisprudence of Dillon and Cooley,
with a clear emphasis on Dillon. On this account, government intervention in
markets is dangerous. Local governments in particular have to be constrained
or they will engage in economic favoritism and fiscally irresponsible practices.
Never mind that states are as guilty of those practices as any local government.
And never mind that pro-housing, anti-corporate-subsidy political coalitions are
already exercising power in cities and influencing urban policy. The instinct to
centralize is hard to resist. It is easier and quicker to go to the state legislature
and get blanket bans on things one does not like instead of doing the work of
building political coalitions locally.
CONCLUSION
Schleicher and others join a long line of skeptics of city power. They are
in good company. As Howe observed in 1905, “reform organizations” have
“voted democracy a failure”—“[t]hey have petitioned State Legislatures to
relieve the overburdened city of the duty of self-government.”177 But as Howe
also observed, to that point the actual exercise of local power had never been
tried.178
Howe’s statement is as true today as it was over a century ago. We are
currently living under a regime of state supremacy, but the solutions to the
challenges of urban governance have not been forthcoming. More to the point,
the increasing abuse of that state supremacy in so much of the country has
undermined policy innovation, harmed public health, and threatened what
democracy has been allowed at the local level. We need a different approach.
The Principles provides that.
For at least a century, state-and-local government law has repeatedly
raised the promise that cities could be empowered to respond to the needs and
salvation in two separate and widely dissimilar bodies. The municipal council controls in minor affairs,
the state legislature in more important matters.”).
177. HOWE, supra note 175, at 1–2.
178. See Brooks, supra note 176, at 225 (observing that home rule does little to advance city power).
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values of their communities. Waves of home-rule reform have tried but largely
failed to live up to that promise. The NLC has offered a vision and a model
constitutional home rule article that can finally set municipal power on a strong
foundation. That foundation is not intended to destroy the ability of states to
articulate and advance genuine statewide interests nor is it designed to permit
cities to secede from the obligations of common governance. Instead, the
Principles is a call to finally realize the potential of something urgently needed
in these challenging times: real local democracy.
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